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THE WEAK LINKS
T
en years ago the literature on the relation
between finance and growth was set on its
modern course by the publication of King
and Levine’s (1993) influential paper. Much of the
following work in this area was done by Ross Levine
and his coauthors. Thus, none better than Levine
himself could summarize the progress over the
past decade, in the struggle to move from a corre-
lation between financial development and economic
development (Goldsmith, 1969) to establishing a
causal relation between finance and growth. 
Levine emphasizes advances along two dimen-
sions. First, in the measures of financial develop-
ment. Goldsmith (1969) relied on the ratio of the
value of financial intermediary assets to gross
domestic product (GDP) as his only measure of
financial development. Levine and coauthors have
used many different variables, e.g., the liquid liability
to GDP ratio, the credit in the private sector to GDP
ratio, and the level of stock market turnover. Rajan
and Zingales (1998) have even used the quality of
accounting standards as a measure of a firm’s ability
to raise funds. Nevertheless, as I will discuss momen-
tarily, this first area is probably where less progress
has been made.
The second and more important dimension
emphasized by Levine’s survey is in the attempt to
establish causality. This is the area where most inno-
vations have taken place. Their first step was to use
the time dimension to identify the cause-effect rela-
tion (King and Levine, 1993), relying on the old
“post hoc ergo propter hoc” argument. Levine and
coauthors have subsequently enriched this approach
using dynamic panel estimation, and further progress
has been made in the use of instrumental variables
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998, and Levine, 1998 and
1999). In both cases they use the La Porta et al.
(1998) measures of legal origin as instrumental
variables. I will discuss later whether and when
these can be considered good instruments.  
A third step in trying to establish causality,
which is not adequately surveyed by Levine, is the
“natural experiment” approach. In a very clever
paper, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) use the bank-
ing deregulation across U.S. states as an exogenous
change in financial development. This omission,
justified on the basis of a decision not to focus on
within-country studies, is the only shortcoming in
Levine’s survey. Personally, I trust much more the
natural experiment approach than the more sophisti-
cated, but less robust, dynamic panel estimation
techniques.
The final step in the quest for a causal link,
amply summarized by Levine, is to look in more
detail at the mechanism through which finance
spurs growth (see, e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1998,
and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998).
In spite of this minor quibble, Levine’s survey
does an excellent job of summarizing the progress
made in the past decade. In 1993 many people
doubted that there was a relation between finance
and growth; now very few do. Since Levine has
documented so well what has been done, my role
as a discussant is to describe what remains to be
done. I will focus, thus, on the weak links in the
quest for a reliable relation between finance and
growth that policymakers can use in their decisions.
I focus on six such weak links.
Good Institutions vs. Finance
As La Porta et al. (1999 and 2002) document,
there is a set of countries that seem to be doing
“the right thing” in many dimensions: Their legal
enforcement is better, their level of generalized trust
higher, their judicial system more efficient and
independent; they have less corruption, less regula-
tion, more respect for property rights, and better-
developed financial markets. Each institution taken
individually has a positive effect on economic
growth. Yet there are too many (highly correlated)
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© 2003, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.variables and too few countries to be able to reliably
identify the effect that one institution has compared
with another.
To make the problem worse, all these variables
are measured with errors. Thus, a multiple regression
may fail to identify which of these variables really
matter.
Finally, these characteristics seem to be very
persistent. In fact, all are highly correlated with the
country from which their legal system originated.
Thus, neither dynamic panel estimation techniques
nor instrumental variables (when the instrument is
correlated with the omitted factor) can help us sepa-
rate the effect of financial development from the
effect of other good institutions.
One could argue that the natural experiment
approach followed by Jayaratne and Strahan (1996)
or the more micro approach followed by Rajan and
Zingales (1998) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1998) can address this issue. In part, this is true. If
I had to convince a policymaker of the importance
of this relation, I would start from this evidence.
Nevertheless, not even this evidence is bullet
proof. In the natural experiment approach, there is
always a possibility that unobserved factors caused
both the deregulation and the higher growth of
some states. For example, Kroszner and Strahan
(1999) show that one of the factors driving deregu-
lation was the diffusion of automated teller machines
(ATMs). This diffusion was not homogenous. ATMs
arrived sooner in California than in Arkansas. This
is not uncorrelated with California being better than
Arkansas at capturing the growth opportunities
provided by new technologies.
An omitted variable is even more of a problem in
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic’s (1998) approach.
After computing a firm-based measure of financial
constraints, they collapse it into a country-level
indicator. In so doing, they fall back into a traditional
country-level regression, which prevents them from
controlling for country-specific factors, as Jayaratne
and Strahan (1996) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) do.
By exploiting the channel through which finance
should have an effect, Rajan and Zingales (1998)
make it more difficult for spurious correlation to
drive their results. For such correlation to exist, both
their measure of external financial dependence and
their instrumented measure of financial develop-
ment would need to be spuriously correlated in the
“right” direction. Potentially, the most serious source
of trouble could be that external financial depen-
dence acts as proxy for growth opportunities in
the more technologically advanced sectors, which
have better opportunities for growth in economically
developed countries (which tend to be also more
financially developed). Rajan and Zingales (1998),
however, consider this possibility and add to their
specification an interaction between their measure
of external dependence and the per capita GDP, as
a proxy for the state’s economic development. While
this addition reduces the size of the coefficient of
financial development, the coefficient remains both
economically and statistically significant. Neverthe-
less, the possibility remains that financial develop-
ment (instrumented by the legal origin variables) is
a better proxy for technological sophistication than
per capita GDP.
In sum, while enormous progress has been
made in the last decade toward establishing a causal
link between finance and growth, we still do not
have the smoking gun.
Measures of Financial Development
For the relation between finance and growth to
be used as a policy tool, we need to improve our
measure of financial development. Thus far, the
literature has mostly relied on the measures that
were easily available, with few links to what theory
suggests the measure should be.
More problematically, some of these measures
can be misleading from a policy point of view.
Consider, for instance, the proxy of financial market
development employed by Levine and Zervos (1998):
volume of stock traded relative to their market
capitalization. There is no question that—as the
authors say—improvement in liquidity should be
beneficial to the economy and that liquidity is pos-
itively correlated with trading volume. Nevertheless,
more stock trading is not necessarily beneficial.
More volume can increase stock volatility, as shown
in a clever paper by French and Roll (1986). And
nobody would dare argue that the diffusion of day
trading has been beneficial to the economy. Never-
theless, an unsophisticated policymaker, who took
the Levine and Zervos (1998) evidence seriously,
would conclude that donating a computer and an
E*Trade® account to every household in Africa would
benefit the economic growth of that continent!
Thus, one dimension in which this literature
must progress is in its measure of financial develop-
ment. From this point of view, it would be useful to
go back to fundamentals. From a theoretical point
of view, the right measure would capture the ease
with which any entrepreneur or company with a
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which this finance could be obtained. A developed
financial system should provide broader access to
finance at a lower cost.
All measures currently used are only vaguely
related to this notion. For example, most papers use
the credit to GDP ratio, but Jayaratne and Strahan
(1996) show that after banking deregulation, when
the efficiency of the financial system most likely
went up, the level of bank debt to GDP did not go
up. It was only the percentage of bad loans that
went down.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) attempt to devise a
measure of financial development that is more linked
to theory. They use the quality of the accounting
standards, which is more likely to be correlated
with the ease of raising external funds than with
any of the previous measures.
More recently, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
(2002) (GSZ) tried to develop a more theory-based
measure of financial development. Since the right
theoretical measure should capture the ease with
which entrepreneurs with sound projects can obtain
finance, they compute the local variation in house-
holds’ access to credit. By using a rich data set of
Italian households, which includes their answer to
the question “Have you been denied credit or been
discouraged from applying for credit in the past
year?” they can identify where, ceteris paribus,
households have easier access to credit. To distin-
guish between overlending and efficient provision
of funds, they control for the percentage of bad
loans in the area. Not only is this a measure related
to the theoretical notion of financial development,
it is also a variable that policymakers can target in
hopes of obtaining the desired final effect.
One potential problem with this approach is
that the measure of financial development may
capture local variation that is correlated with access
to credit. To guard against this potential problem,
GSZ instrument their measure of financial develop-
ment by using some historical constraints present
in the Italian banking system. This specificity, how-
ever, limits the applicability of this method to other
environments. Hence, more work is needed on this
dimension. 
Mechanisms Through Which Finance
Works
Much of the literature has focused on proving
that the observed correlation between finance and
growth is causal. Less attention has been focused
on understanding the channels through which
finance works. Establishing the main channel is
important not only for instilling confidence in the
theory of a causal link, but also from a policy point
of view. Only by understanding the channel through
which this relation works can we help policymakers
design effective policies to promote growth.
Identifying the most important channels will
also help us settle the question of which aspects of
the financial system are more important. Most
studies agree that having a more developed banking
sector is better than having an underdeveloped one.
But there is still a lot of uncertainty about whether
a developed equity market provides an additional
benefit, even more so if the development of the
equity market occurs at the expense of the develop-
ment of the banking system.
One approach in establishing the main channels
is to derive some cross-sectional implications about
which firms or industries would benefit the most
from financial development. This is the approach
followed by Rajan and Zingales (1998).
Another approach is to trace the effects of
financial development from the micro evidence to
the macro. For example, Rajan and Zingales (1998)
show that financial development provides greater
benefit to the growth in the number of establish-
ments than to the growth in the average size of the
establishment. This would suggest that one of the
channels through which finance affects growth is
by promoting entrepreneurship. Not only do GSZ
find such evidence in their Italian micro data set,
but they also show how this effect translates into a
higher growth of firms in more financially developed
areas and ultimately in higher GDP growth. More
evidence of this kind is needed.
Does Domestic Financial Development
Matter?
All the evidence on the impact of finance on
growth has measured the development of finance
at the country level and ignored the possibility that
financial institutions and markets from a neighbor-
ing country could substitute for deficiencies in the
domestic financial system. In the past, this was not
such a strong assumption. International capital
movements were extremely limited. In recent years,
however, private capital flows have grown dramati-
cally. International listings also grew dramatically
over the 1990s. Now, more Israeli companies are
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ask, then, whether Israel needs a local capital market.
This question is extremely important from a policy
point of view. Do emerging markets need to develop
their domestic financial institutions and markets
or, in the current scenario with high capital mobility,
can they piggyback on the financial systems of
developed countries?
Unfortunately, this is a difficult question to
answer empirically. The integration of national
financial markets is so recent that we lack a suffi-
ciently long time series to estimate its impact in
the data. At the same time, the pace of integration
is so fast that, if we were to establish that national
financial development mattered for national growth
during the past decade, we could not confidently
extrapolate this result to the current decade.
To try to assess the relevance for growth of
national financial institutions and markets in an
increasingly integrated capital market, GSZ follow
a different approach. Rather than study the effect
of financial development across countries, they
study the effect of local financial development
within a single country—one that has been unified
for the past 140 years—Italy. The level of integration
achieved in Italy probably represents an upper
bound for the level of integration that international
financial markets can reach. The authors find that
local financial development matters for growth
within Italy. Hence, one can safely conclude that
national financial development will continue to
matter for national growth in the foreseeable future.
It still remains to be established, however, to
what extent foreign institutions can substitute
domestic ones. Consistent with Petersen and Rajan
(2002), GSZ’s evidence suggests that small firms
encounter barriers to distance lending. They do not
find these barriers for large firms. Thus, domestic
financial development might be an issue for small
firms only.
Other Effects of Financial Development
Thus far, the literature has focused on the effects
of finance on GDP growth, with occasional reference
to investment and total factor productivity growth.
Not only is this single-minded focus unwarranted—
because there are several aspects we care about
besides economic growth—but it is also harmful.
These are conditions of the economic system that
might impact the long-run ability to grow, such as
competition, firm size, and industry concentration,
but also aspects we care about directly, such as
social mobility and income distribution. There are
sound theoretical reasons why financial develop-
ment might impact these variables. Greater access
to funds, for instance, facilitates new entry of
firms, which breeds competition. At the same time,
it makes it easier for poor individuals to exploit
their talents, promoting social mobility but also,
possibly, worsening the income distribution. Thus,
there is no justification for ignoring these aspects.
To be fair, there is already evidence on some of
these effects. Haber (1991) presents an interesting
case study of the effects of financial development
in promoting competition. Similarly, GSZ show that,
in more financially developed areas, firms’ mark-ups
are lower, indicating more intense competition.
Finally, Cetorelli (2001) shows that a more concen-
trated financial sector is associated with larger firms.
Not only are these effects interesting, per se,
they might also shed light on the political support
(or lack thereof) for financial development. If
finance breeds competition, then incumbent firms
might not be so thrilled to see finance develop. I
will return to this issue momentarily.
In this search for the additional effects of
financial development, it is important to acknowl-
edge the possible negative effects. While the over-
whelming evidence at this point suggests a positive
overall effect of finance, it is well possible that finan-
cial development also has negative consequences.
For example, are financially developed systems
more prone to financial crisis or bubbles? The pos-
sibility exists. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), for
instance, show that in 18 of 26 banking crises in
the past two decades, the financial sector was liber-
alized in the preceding 5 years. More research is
needed on this issue as well. 
What Causes Financial Development?
Thus far, all the literature points to financial
development as being beneficial. So then, if finance
is indeed so good, why don’t we see more of it?
What does cause financial development (or lack
thereof)? This question is important from the per-
spective of both theory and policy. From a theoretical
point of view, as stated earlier, only by understand-
ing the real causes of financial development can
we devise the appropriate instruments to identify
the causal relation between finance and growth. 
From a policy perspective, this is probably the
most important question. It is of little use to know
that a relation between finance and growth exists
50 JULY/AUGUST 2003
Zingales R EVIEWif policymakers do not know how to promote finan-
cial development. What do we know on this count? 
La Porta et al. (1997) show a strong correlation
between financial development (and, in particular,
financial markets development) and the presence
of a legal and regulatory infrastructure. Their conjec-
ture is that, for external finance to develop, investors
need to be protected by laws and regulations. This
conjecture is supported by further work. Dyck and
Zingales (2002), for instance, show that private
benefits of control are lower in countries with better
laws and regulations, suggesting that outside
investors are indeed better protected there. They
also show that markets with a lower level of private
benefits are more developed. 
This evidence, however, compels the question
of why these better laws and regulations are not
introduced in all countries. La Porta et al. (1998)
claim that there is something specific to common-
law tradition that makes a common-law country
more protective of property rights and in particu-
lar more attentive to investors’ property rights. In
La Porta et al. (1998) they identify a number of
statutes that protect investors, and they show that
these statutes are more often present in common-
law countries than in civil-law countries.
The source of the difference, however, cannot
be so simplistic. If there is political will, civil-law
countries can easily copy common-law statutes.
Hence, either those statutes are not the source of
the difference or the problem resides in the lack of
political will. In several papers, Andrei Shleifer and
coauthors have explored alternative reasons why
common-law countries protect investors more. They
have focused on the three aspects that differentiate
them: the general stance of government, i.e., their
degree of interventionism; the structure of the legal
system, in particular the politicization of judges;
and the strength of common-law principles, such
as “smell tests.” Of these three, only the last is intrin-
sically linked to the essence of the common-law
tradition, making it hard to export in civil-law coun-
ties. The other two compel the same question: If
there is political will, why don’t civil-law countries
imitate the more successful institutions of common-
law countries?
As suggested, a possible answer is that these
countries lack political will. In fact, Rajan and
Zingales (2001, 2003) point out that reforms to pro-
mote financial development can be opposed by
the dominant elite, who benefit from oligopolistic
and nontransparent markets. Since these elites are
wealthy and well connected, they could easily shape
political action even in well-established democracies.
But their power is reduced when a country is open
to foreign goods and capital. Consistent with this
interpretation, they find evidence that financial
markets develop the most in countries and in periods
of free capital and goods mobility.
An additional explanation is that better laws
and regulations simply reflect a more fundamental
trait of some countries or communities, where
people vote, obey the law, and cooperate with each
other and whose leaders are honest and committed
to the public good (Putnam, 1993 and 1995). As
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2000) show, these
characteristics, often labeled “social capital,” are
highly correlated with the use and the availability
of financial instruments at the local level and with
financial development across countries. Unfortu-
nately, we still know very little about what causes
social capital to use these findings as an effective
policy tool.
In sum, the debate on the causes of financial
development is still in its infancy and a lot more
remains to be learned.
CONCLUSION
In his survey, Levine emphasizes how much we
have learned in the past decade about the relation
between finance and growth. Here, I have stressed
how much we still need to know before this relation
can be confidently used for policy purposes. In this
area, the next decade promises to be as exciting as
the past one.   
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